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HANDS OFF: WHEN AND ABOUT WHAT
Kent Greenawalt*
I.

Two GENERAL. THOUGHTS

I was very pleased to have the chance to comment on these four
thoughtful and challenging papers when they were delivered orally at
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Convention in January, and I am glad to have the opportunity to share some of my unsystematic thoughts about their published versions. I begin with two
general observations before addressing the individual essays in turn.
When I came up with the phrase "Hands Off' to liven the title of
my article on judicial resolutions of property disputes generated by
splits in religious groups,1 I had not reflected on the wide range of
issues that might be couched similarly. The themes of the AALS symposium and the substance of these papers, as well as Samuel Levine's
Introduction, showjust how broadly that concept may stretch. A great
many problems regarding the law of the religious clauses 2 might be
put in terms of whether the government should refrain from involving
itself with religion.
With recognition of the hands-off implications of various issues,
we need to keep in mind an important caution. That concept is far
from capturing all the constitutional values that are relevant, and the
dangers of hands on are much more worrisome in some instances
than in others.
Here is one illustrative comparison. Were the courts to delve into
religious doctrines to resolve intrachurch property disputes, they
© 2009 Kent Greenawalt. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre

Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* University Professor, Columbia University Law School.
I Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998). Most of the content of this Essay is also in 1
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS

261-89 (2006).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
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would be choosing the understanding of one group of sincere worshippers over the understanding of another such group. These disputes arise just because practitioners understand the requisites of
their faith in sharply opposed ways. To decide in favor of one side
promotes the exercise of religion of that side at the expense of the
exercise of religion of the other side. By contrast, if the courts make
some inquiry into the content of the religious belief of an individual
who seeks an exemption from some standard requirement (say, to be
willing to work on Saturday in order to receive unemployment compensation), 3 it may fail to keep its hands off; but it does something
that is necessary to facilitate certain forms of free exercise, it does not
need to resolve any competing religious claims, and it does not frustrate the religious exercise of one of two competing groups. 4 One
may conclude (as I do) that the reasons for the government to stay
out of assessing religious claims is much stronger when resolving disputes by reference to church doctrine than when the content of an
individual's claim is at stake, and that the value to free exercise of
making the latter inquiry is well worth the cost. But whatever conclusion one draws about this particular comparison, one needs to keep in
mind that the rubric of hands off is one possible beginning, not the
end, of analysis.
My second general point concerns a difference between what one
needs to resolve in theory in order to have a coherent, systematic
approach to a range of issues, and what actual decisionmakers must
settle in order to deal with most practical issues. Despite the aspirations and entirely appropriate efforts of legal scholars to critique
murky confusions and compromises and offer proposals to clarify,
judges and other legal actors manage to stumble along with fair success without resolving certain deeply troubling theoretical issues. One
such issue is exactly what constitutes legislative intent. Another may
be what precisely counts as religious for various constitutional and
statutory purposes. 5 Of course, if the law requires classification in
3 If the special treatment concerns something like keeping isolated geographical
areas free of distractions to open air worship or allowing the importation of a forbidden substance, it may be a group's tenets that need to be discerned. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434-37 (2006).
4 This sentence puts aside, for the moment, the equality concerns that underlie
much of what Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager say. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
807 (2009).
5 Andrew Koppelman makes just this point in his essay. See Andrew Koppelman,
The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 865,
881-82 (2009).
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terms of religion, decisionmakers need some notion of what religion
is. A number of scholars, including myself, have offered suggestions
for how to draw the necessary line(s). 6 But if in the vast majority of
cases, a claim or attribute is definitely religious or definitely not religious without regard to which of the competing approaches one follows, judges may manage adequately almost all of the time without
clearly adopting one approach in lieu of others. To generalize, uncertainty about the precise way to resolve one element in a chain of elements necessary to resolve a particular claim may or may not seriously
undermine the entire effort. It is at least possible that religion clause
law and related legal areas can function reasonably well in treating
religion as special, without an authoritative settlement of just how to
draw the line between religion and nonreligion.
II.

NOT HAVING TO DEFINE RELIGION As ONE REASON NOT TO
TREAT RELIGION As SPECIAL

My last point leads naturally to the essay by Provost Eisgruber and
Dean Sager. They suggest that the very effort to define religion may
involve undermining the egalitarian values of the religion clauses by
"creating a sphere of orthodoxy. ''7 The authors have elsewhere
mounted a powerful argument that the crucial value of religious
clauses is to build a protective fence against discrimination-that the
application of the clauses should involve treating religious beliefs and
practices like analogous nonreligious beliefs and practices, rather
than treating religion better or worse than analogous nonreligion. 8
Their position is well illustrated by the two Ms. Campbells who are
driven by conscience and compulsion to operate soup kitchens-one
Ms. Campbell resting on the teaching of her faith, the other moved by
a nonreligious response to suffering of the poor. 9 The authors
strongly believe the two women should be treated in the same way;
that approach will avoid any necessity to figure out which claims are
religious. 10 I shall return shortly to this illustration, after making a few
quick observations.
The strongest reasons that Eisgruber and Sager have for not treating religion as special do not concern problems of definition, and my
6 My own proposal is in Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CA.. L.
753 (1984), with some elaboration in 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 124-56.
7 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 4, at 807.
8

See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE

(2007).
Eisgruber and Sager, supra note 4, at 808.
See id. at 826-30.

THE CONSTITUTION 51-78

9
10
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responses to their main arguments are in an essay that considers their
compelling book-length treatment.1 1 In any case in which the matter
is crucial and the answer is in doubt-a very small percentage of
cases-the need to decide the borders of religion is troubling, but
that is not a major basis to decide whether religion should ever be
2
treated differently from analogous nonreligion.1
If one believes, as I do, that religion should sometimes be
regarded distinctively by the law, it does not follow that the constitutional line under the religion clauses will always be to distinguish religious claims from analogous nonreligious ones. Thus, I have no doubt
that one aspect of religious liberty under the Constitution is a freedom of atheists and agnostics not to embrace religion, and I also
believe that nonreligious conscientious objectors to military service
must, constitutionally, be treated like religious objectors.1 3 Once a
court determines that in a particular context religious and nonreligious claims must be treated equally, it does not need to determine if
a particular claimant is religious. Such ajudgment, however, may still
be necessary in other cases for which the presence of religious elements may be crucial.
The Eisgruber-Sager position is most appealing when claimants
seek exemptions from ordinary legal requirements. I find the position difficult to sustain for many Establishment Clause issues. The
government cannot teach the truth or falsity of religious propositions;
it can teach the truth or soundness of many assertions in the realm of
political philosophy ("liberal democracy is a better form of government than autocracy") and morality ("we have a basic responsibility to
help others"). Of course, a public school cannot compel students to
believe any of these views, but it can offer them as true or sound in a
4
way it cannot offer 'Jesus Christ is our Savior.'
Another domain in which it is hard for the law to avoid saying
what is religious is that of discrimination. Statutes bar discrimination
11 See Kent Greenawalt, How Does "EqualLiberty" Fare in Relation to Other Approaches
to the Religion Clauses?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1217 (2007) (book review); see also 2 KENT

462-79
(2008) (addressing Provost Eisgruber and Dean Sager's "equal liberty" approach to
the religion clauses).
12 I do not take Eisgruber's and Sager's essay here to suggest otherwise.
13 Since I think Daniel Seeger, whom my father Kenneth W. Greenawalt represented, was a religious person who did not believe in God (as the statute required), see
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965), the clearer example of a nonreligious claimant was raised in the later case of Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338
(1970).
14 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 11, at 465-70; Greenawalt, supra note 11, at
1233-38.
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
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on grounds of religion, 15 and if the government itself discriminated
on that basis in employment, or in many other transactions, it would
act unconstitutionally. If a government official refuses to hire someone because she does not like his appearance, that is not unconstitutional; if she rejects him because he wears a yarmulke or a cross, that is
unconstitutional. In such instances, a court must determine what
amounts to discrimination on grounds of religion.
Now, to the exemption issue raised by the Ms. Campbells. The
Eisgruber and Sager approach to the problem would not require a
court to decide what counts as religion, but it might need to reconstruct the individual's beliefs to ascertain the strength of his or her
claim. The authors approve assessment of a "phenomenological claim
about what the claimant in fact believes"16-an approach the
Supreme Court has taken in cases of unwillingness to participate in
making armaments 17 and unwillingness to work on Sundays.18 That
examination can involve: (1) a judgment about the sincerity of a person who asserts beliefs whose content is undoubtedly religious; and
(2) a judgment whether that content adequately supports reasons for
special treatment. For example, if a claimant sincerely said that his
religion teaches that people should try to be happy and that he would
be happier if he didn't work on Saturday, a court might not view that
as an adequate reason to be exempt from a requirement that, to
receive unemployment compensation, one must be willing to accept
jobs that include work on Saturday.
What is evident on reflection is that if the Eisgruber-Sager
approach to exemptions were accepted, there would still be a difficult
line to be drawn in some instances, though the line would be cast in
terms other than religion. Objectors to military service must be conscientious; is it a conscientious objection to believe one could much
better serve one's country by teaching children of poverty in an inner
city? If the state offers some exemptions from childhood vaccinations,
how must it treat a couple that sincerely says they are persuaded by
scientific evidence that vaccination is, overall, more dangerous than
beneficial? Or how must a couple be treated if, recognizing that a
particular vaccination is highly beneficial in general, they honestly
believe that their children will be best served by not being vaccinated
given the lowered risk of disease that results from virtually all other
children being vaccinated.
15
16
17
18

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 4, at 813.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1981).
Frazee v. I11.Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
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Similar difficulties arise in respect to avoiding work on Saturday
or Sunday. In their book, Eisgruber and Sager, write of a (hypothetical) mother, who wants to stay home on Saturday to care for her children. 19 She could pay for childcare and would not experience the
"inflexible obligation" of the Seventh-Day Adventist who succeeded in
a free exercise entitlement to unemployment compensation in the
case of Sherbert v. Verner.20 But why should we assume that getting
childcare would satisfy the parent's sense of obligation? A parent
might well feel that an overarching responsibility in life was to nurture
her children herself, including being with them on weekends. Would
this be sufficient to receive an exemption? 2 1 Eisgruber and Sager do
offer serious arguments for not ever making the success of claims for
exemption depend on their being religious, but whatever alternative
categorization might be made very likely would involve lines that
themselves could be extremely troublesome to draw in occasional
cases.
III.

RELIGION AND COMMERCE

Bernadette Meyler addresses a number of aspects of financial
transactions that concern religious groups and religious claims, giving
us illuminating comparisons between the United States Supreme
Court and the European Court of Human Rights. 22 She focuses partly

on a significant theoretical issue: whether a line separates religion
from commerce or whether the two overlap. 23 On this point, the
overlap conception is clearly preferable. It is certainly possible that
sincere religious beliefs and religious practices may include transactions that are undoubtedly commercial (unless one simply posits that
anything genuinely religious cannot also be commercial). Consider a
church that purchases a block of tickets to a play about the life of
Jesus. The minister preaches that the movie is spiritually uplifting and
urges members to purchase tickets at the basic sales price. The transaction between the church and a member buying a ticket is as commercial so far as the member is concerned as if the minister had
urged members to see the movie and buy tickets at the box office. To
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 8, at 115-16.
374 U.S. 398, 400 n.1 (1963); see EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 8, at 116.
If one demanded an "inflexible obligation," one would doubt whether the
nonreligious Ms. Campbell would feel that about her soup kitchen. One would also

19
20
21

wonder whether such an approach would unfairly favor the absolutists among us
(religious and nonreligious) over those with a more nuanced view of human
responsibilities.
22 Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2009).
23 Id. at 906-11.
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say that religion and commercial transactions can overlap, however,
does not tell us, by itself, how the government should regard the transactions, nor does it tell us what is constitutionally permissible.
Some version of the "quid pro quo" approach seems the right way
to distinguish purchases (which a taxpayer cannot treat as charitable
donations 24) from genuine donations. If a church collects from members for tickets to movies, plays, or operas, or for meals a church
group has at a regular restaurant, the purchaser cannot treat the ordinary cost of the entertainment or meal as a donation, though he may
25
treat extra cost ($50 if he pays $150 for a $100 ticket) in that way. It
would be obviously unfair if church members purchasing ordinary
items through their church could claim deductions for the standard
cost of the items; and a rule that allowed this would give religious
groups an incentive to become retail outlets for a variety of products.
Thus, some quid pro quo limit on donations is needed.
The problem is how to draw the line. We can quickly rule out two
possibilities. The legal test cannot be whether the donor believes a
donation will benefit her. Let us say she donates $50,000 to her
church, with no strings attached and with no tangible benefit in
return. She should not lose her tax deduction because she hopes and
expects (1) that her spiritual welfare will be enhanced by her gift, (2)
that she will feel better about herself, or (3) that she will gain respect
from fellow members.
The second nonstarter would be to suppose that the "value" of
ordinary goods that counts is the purchaser's estimate of their worth
to her. One who purchases a $100 meal or opera ticket through a
church can't claim all but $5 as a donation on the basis that she actually dislikes opera or fancy food but wished to participate with her
church community. The problem here is administrability. The Internal Revenue Service can't try to figure out if people are being honest
if they say they really didn't want items they paid for and that have a
standard value in the market.
I believe quid pro quo analysis should rest on two crucial features:
Is "the good" one that comes directly to the payer? And is "the good"
one of ordinary social life, rather than mainly one in a transcendent
or spiritual realm? If a couple pays a set fee for marital counseling by
a minister, that would be a quid pro quo even if the couple thought
24

See Treas. Reg.

§ 1.170A-1 (h) (1) (as amended in 2008).

25 Id. § 1.170A-1 (h) (1) to (2) (allowing purchases for consideration to be treated
as charitable donations to the extent that the taxpayer's payment exceeds fair market

value).
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the counseling would confer some spiritual benefit. 26 If a woman
gives a large amount of money to repair stained glass windows in her
church, that is a donation although she will benefit with others from
her church being more beautiful.
If the benefit goes to the payer but is of a transcendent or spiritual kind, that should not count as quid pro quo. 2 7 Here are two
examples: First, a church makes tithing a condition of membership;
tithing should still count as a donation although in a sense it
"purchases" the benefit of continuing membership. Second, a church
member is assured that if she contributes a certain amount, her time
in purgatory after death will be significantly reduced. The contribution should nevertheless count as a donation. The hard issues concern goods that resemble secular goods but that have distinctive
elements (is the "clearing" of Scientologists with e-meters sufficiently
like nonspiritual psychological counseling? 28 ) or the goods mix some
personal advantage to the payer with broader benefits (paying a pew
rent assists the church but also assures a good seat). Trying to work
out the best dimensions of a quid pro quo approach is far from simple-and one can easily perceive the opportunities for prejudice
against unfamiliar and unpopular faiths-but I see no plausible alternative to such an effort.
What of advertising to encourage members or nonmembers to
make quid pro quo purchases, or to donate money to join a religious
group? If a religious group acts as a sales representative for an ordinary product and makes no religious appeal, that would count as ordinary advertising subject to standard regulations. 29 Years ago, "Monks'
Bread" was sold in the New York area. Although advertised with a
slogan along the lines of "baked in the quiet of the monastery," there
was no genuine religious appeal. Even if "Monks' Bread" was sold by a
religious organization, its advertising should be regulated like that of
any other bread. Indeed, even if a religious or spiritual appeal were
combined with ordinary product claims that are subject to simple factual assessments of accuracy, such as the product's physical ingredi26 To be clear, it is my sense that clergy rarely do set fees for counseling.
27 This proposition is at least arguable. One might say that when payment is
made for any benefit that goes specifically to the payer, that should not count as a
donation.
28 See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989) (describing
Scientology's process of "auditing").
29 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985)
("It is virtually self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program
actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious fights.").
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ents, the ordinary claims could be treated like similar claims made by
nonreligious sellers of similar products.
When an effort to raise money does not fall into a typical quid
pro quo category, religious organizations and their leaders are still
subject to certain requirements of truthfulness. If a religious group
seeks donations specifically to alleviate poverty or build a church, and
instead uses the money raised to sustain a lavish lifestyle for the
group's leaders, the leaders can be prosecuted for fraudulent misrepresentation. That is the theory on which Jim Bakker and some of his
co-leaders were prosecuted, 30 and it is the undeniable core of prosecutions that should be allowed under the Free Exercise Clause-a core
accepted even by those who agree with Justice Jackson's dissent in
United States v. Ballard2' that fraud prosecutions should not be
founded on the theory that leaders who make assertions about reli2
gions or spiritual truth are being insincere.3
When it comes to possible state regulation of advertising, governments cannot regulate assertions of spiritual claims as inaccurate or
misleading, as they can regulate assertions about the ordinary health
benefits of medicines or foods. And the Supreme Court has cautiously maintained the position that certain sales of religious materials
by proselytizers cannot be subject to license taxes that are applied to
ordinary sales.3 3 It is doubtful whether either in respect to the truth
of spiritual claims or licensing, religion actually enjoys (or should
enjoy) a special exemption; the treatment accorded to religious
expression may also have to be extended to nonreligious ideological
expression.3 4 But whatever the answer to that question, the solicitation of money for religious purposes is definitely not subject to all of
the forms of regulation allowed for ordinary commercial expression.
IV.

CORRUPTION AND THE VALUE OF RELIGION

Andrew Koppelman argues persuasively that one strong reason
for the government not to meddle in religious doctrines and practice
is to avoid corruption, and he sees this reason as resting on a premise
that religion is valuable. 35 I think the connection between the reason
30
31

United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 731-32 (4th Cir. 1991).
322 U.S. 78 (1944).

32

Id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

33 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
34 For my discussion of this possibility, see 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at
286-88.
35 See Koppelman, supra note 5, at 867-69.
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and the premise is somewhat more complicated than one might
gather from his essay.
Koppelman stresses that whatever may have been true two centuries ago, one should not ground the protections of the religion
clauses on a belief that a particular religion or theological view, such
as mainstream Protestant Christianity, is sound and deserves various
protections on that basis.3 6 For constitutional purposes, he writes that
we must now understand the value of religion much more broadly, in
a much more encompassing way.3 7 But once we take religion in this
broader way, we should recognize that government does not show
undue favoritism if it favors or promotes religion in general.
I find a degree of indeterminacy or ambiguity in just what counts
as religion and as the government promoting religion. In his essay,
Koppelman specifies various goods of religion, such as harmony with
the transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists) and encouragement in dealing with the heartbreaks of our lives, before remarking
that no general description of the good of religion is possible and that
the government may not prefer some religious propositions over
others.38 Koppelman is clear that not every believer and practitioner
of religion experiences every "good" of religion, and that the government cannot decide which goods of religion people need to find.
There remains, however, a lurking question about the dogmatic atheist who concludes that religion is an unhelpful crutch that derives
from delusion and that it, in every form, subtracts from the value of
human life. Such a position does represent one answer to a series of
questions about the meaning and value of human existence, including
answers to some questions about theological propositions. Without a
doubt, religious liberty includes the freedom to reject religion altogether, to adopt this adamant atheist viewpoint. 39 But can the government favor positive religious belief and practice in various ways? If so,
it may be disfavoring this wholly negative set of answers to questions
about religion. A closely related question is whether what may be seen
as having value is people addressing and responding to religious questions (with positive or negative answers) or actually practicing religion
in some form. Of course, one might value both addressing the questions and practicing, but exactly what the government could favor
might depend on which of these valuations is most central.
36 See id. at 880-82.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 881-82.
39 SeeWallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) ("[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.").
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I shall mention briefly a somewhat related difference. Koppel40
Various
man comments on a tradition of religious individualism.
religious traditions are more or less individualistic, and many forms of
religious upbringing do not greatly encourage individual thought and
autonomy. If one believed that much of the religion's value resides in
individuals themselves addressing and answering theological questions, one might conclude that discouraging certain forms of religious
practice actually promotes that value. One thinks of Wisconsin v.
Yoder 1 as an instance in which liberty of the Amish religion and its
practice could be seen as pitted against an ideal of autonomous
choice about what religious propositions to believe and what religion
to practice (an ideal that might have been served by keeping Amish
children in school).
However these minor questions about Koppelman's thesis might
be resolved, there remains an issue about the status of valuing religion
and a perplexity about what constitutes corruption. I agree with Koppelman that officials and citizens may regard the value of religion, in
his general sense, as a foundation for much of the constitutional law
about religion; but I believe one can also reach a similar conclusion
without embracing that premise. The point is simplest with respect to
accommodations. So long as many citizens do care deeply about religion-including attitudes that relations with God and certain religious
practices take priority in their lives over their responsibilities as citizens to comply with the law-the government has reason when feasible to avoid conflicts between law and religious practice. Even
someone who thinks religion is without value has a ground to suppose
that government should avoid requiring pacifists to serve in the mili42
tary under a general draft.
Something similar may be said about the corruption of interference. Suppose one thinks religion is without value or that the positive
and negative values are about equal, or one is unsure about religion's
value. One might still believe that governable interference will make
things worse, that it will lead to manipulation that renders religion
and politics worse than they would otherwise be. In other words, one
could worry about degradation or corruption, while doubting that a
practice has positive value in the first place. Things can almost always
get worse, and sometimes government involvement is a promising
strategy for just that deterioration.
40 See Koppelman, supra note 5, at 876-78.
41 406 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1972).
42 My remarks here leave open the question of how analogous nonreligious
objectors should be treated.
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In his discussion of conditions on receiving educational aid, Koppelman apparently embraces the view that actual corruption occurs
only if a religion is drawn away from its genuine beliefs and practices. 43 It follows from this view that courts are not in a position to
discern if corruption has occurred in any individual case. Since it is
enough for him that the potential for corruption must be avoided,
what one defines as actual corruption is not critical. But, for what it is
worth, one might take a somewhat broader view of corruption than he
does. If a judge accepts a payment to decide a case in a certain way,
we think corruption is present even if the judge would decide the
same way without the payment, and even if the judge is so conscientious that he never accepts a payment unless he has already determined to decide the case the way the briber wishes. If the government
improperly offers payments to religious groups to accept doctrines or
threatens coercion unless they renounce doctrines, we might think of
that as corruption whether or not the groups deflect one iota from
what they would otherwise do. At the very least, others may then wonder about the motivational springs of those leading the religion; and,
once the government incentives or threats are in place, the leaders
themselves may find it hard to avoid being influenced at all by what
the government has done (even if the consequence is to lead them to
dig in their heels to resist government pressure). According to this
broader view of corruption, the question does not come down simply
to whether the government action is likely to incline people to deflect
from the dictates of a religion. Telling religious groups that they will
benefit or suffer from government action depending on the doctrines
they teach (the danger posed by setting conditions on religious teachings of private schools) is qualitatively different from undertaking government programs (such as requiring equal pay for women and men
or supporting public education to the exclusion of private education)
that may incline some people to act in ways contrary to what their
religions recommend.
V.

OVERLAPPING CONCERNS AND JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Richard Garnett's essay builds from the basic premise that governments have a variety of concerns that may be aided or threatened
by religious doctrine. 44 Garnett argues that if the notions that religion is a private matter and that the government has no interest in
religion are taken to mean that really nothing of importance to the
43 Koppelman, supra note 5, at 883-85.
44 Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-OffApproach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About., 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009).
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government is at stake in what religious people practice, these notions
are false. 45 This conclusion strikes me as undoubtedly correct. The
government has an interest in reducing the commission of crimes, in
reducing antisocial noncriminal behavior, and in promoting civic virtues. Not only may certain religions positively encourage various
forms of criminal behavior, so also religious doctrines and practices
may sometimes have the unintended effect of increasing such behavior. The same may be true of some antisocial but noncriminal behavior. Instances of racial and gender bias may be socially hurtful even if
they are neither criminal nor form the basis of civil liability. Once
one understands these basic realities, the overlap between government concerns and religious concerns is evident. Here are related
illustrative examples where factual premises have at least a patina of
plausibility. By insisting on a celibate priesthood, the Roman Catholic
Church indirectly produces a higher incidence of sexual abuse of
minors by priests than would occur if married persons were permitted
to become priests. 46 By not allowing women to become priests, the
Church has retarded to a degree the accomplishment of full equality
for women in other areas of life (such as secular workplaces and families). 47 Were one to ask only about government interest, one might
find a basis for the government to tell the Church what criteria it may
use to choose priests, and perhaps to regulate how priests are trained
and supervised.
When we turn from government interests to ways in which the
government might affect doctrines and practices, some are more
acceptable than others. The government may present as true or
sound various conclusions about science, morality, and political philosophy that are at odds with the doctrines of certain religious groups.
Without a doubt, it may prohibit and regulate various activities without reference to religious belief and practices, for example, barring
racial and gender discrimination in employment. 48 These standard
government practices may exert some indirect effort on what religious
people are likely to accept and how existing religions are likely to
develop. If the law forbids polygamy, a religion may become some45 Id. at 839-42.
46 A serious factual evaluation of this thesis would need to undertake a study of
sexual abuse of minors in other institutions and a comparison of whether such abuse
is actually less common among (mostly heterosexual) married men than men who
remain unmarried and have no open sexual partner.
47 Here one would need to discern whether this narrow limit on women's opportunities does affect broader attitudes.
48 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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what less likely to teach the virtues of polygamy; 49 if the government

refuses tax benefits to universities engaged in racial discrimination, a
religion may be inclined to alter practices of racial classification. 50
The legitimacy of such measures is not undermined if some in the
government harbor a hope that religious beliefs and practices may be
affected, so long as a sound justification and the main motivation lie
51
elsewhere.
Direct government efforts to alter or maintain religious doctrines
and practices are another matter altogether. It may well be that
within the United States, it will be better for the country as a whole if
more moderate versions of Islam prevail over versions that are
extreme, if "extreme versions" include sharply opposing American
ideas of liberal democracy and promoting violence as an appropriate
means of opposition. But it does not follow that the government
should funnel money to moderate leaders to assist them in efforts to
persuade others to their position. Additionally, if such action would
be improper domestically, it is at least a serious issue whether our government should be making similar efforts in foreign countries in
which achievement of political stability and a government's friendly
relations with the United States matter to us.
Professor Garnett regards many of the reasons offered for the
government to stay out of religion as less than compelling and thinks
the strongest reason is a basic division of jurisdiction-that religion is
simply not the government's business. 5 2 One might regard internal
family life in much the manner Garnett treats religion. The government has substantial interests at stake in how members of families
treat each other, but perhaps within certain boundaries, such as barring physical coercion, families, i.e. parents, should be left free to
decide how to manage their internal relations. 53
49 For example, in 1890, Wilford Woodruff, President of The Church of Jesus
Christ and Latter-day Saints, issued his Manifesto which officially ended the Church's
support for plural marriages-eleven years after the Supreme Court rejected polygamy in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1879). See generally RICHARD S.
VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY 133-40 (1989).
50 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
51 Apart from what courts may examine, it is a troubling question how far officials
should act in accord with reasons independent of religion if an actual dominant
motive is to affect religion. My own sense is that it is usually, if not always, improper
for officials to take action with the dominant motive to affect religion, even if they can
find alternative reasons to support what they do.
52

See Garnett, supra note 44, at 854-63.
53 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) ("[I]t cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fun-
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My own view is that many factors point toward government's
avoiding involvement with various choices made within religions, but I
do think what Garnett has emphasized is a very strong reason. I shall
comment briefly on competence, and then raise two questions about
the jurisdictional divide. Garnett is right that courts are well able on
the basis of expert testimony to discern the content of many religious
beliefs and practices, 54 but we need to distinguish this competence
from the possible ability of government officials to decide what religious views are true or sound. That is not an exercise for which officers
of government are well suited, especially because they are under a
constant temptation or inclination to find that soundness or truth
comports with political advantage. Even in respect to discerning the
core beliefs and practices of religious groups, one crucial problem
when a dispute within a group arises is how susceptible or open to
change a religion should be. Is a shift from seating that segregates by
gender a central or core change in a group's practices? An answer to
this question is not entirely descriptive; it involves a degree of normative judgment of a kind different from the usual judgments courts
make. A further problem, of course, is the potential for judicial bias
or discrimination (conscious or not), which may be much greater
when judges are dealing with subjects (such as religion and political
ideology) than when they discern the central premises of a group
founded for cancer research.
A fundamental question about Garrett's thesis is whether he
means it to apply to religion and government in general, or to liberal
democracy, or to some other less than universal category of forms of
political organization. Suppose members of a simple religious group
create a political society in a remote location. Would it be wrong for
them to mix religion and government, perhaps by assigning a significant political role to religious leaders? One can certainly imagine
understandings of religion and government that would not recommend Garnett's sharp jurisdictional division. Perhaps it is sufficient to
respond that in advanced, diverse, modern societies, liberal democracy is the best form of government, and that form should include
recognition of religion as having a kind of domain of its own.
Although Garnett and Koppelman see their basic justifications
for hands off as distinct, not only could the two approaches fit
together in an understanding of a range of relevant factors, one might
regard them as fairly closely related. According to the broad sense of
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.").
54 See Garnett, supra note 44, at 857-58.
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corruption I have suggested, a breach of the relevant jurisdictional
boundaries might itself be seen as a kind of corruption, a bringing to
bear of improper influences on a domain that should remain unaffected (or uncorrupted) by such influences.

